We continue the study of welfare maximization in unit-demand (matching) markets, in a distributed information model where agent's valuations are unknown to the central planner, and therefore communication is required to determine an efficient allocation. Dobzinski, Nisan and Oren (STOC'14) showed that if the market size is n, then r rounds of interaction (with logarithmic bandwidth) suffice to obtain an n 1/(r+1) -approximation to the optimal social welfare. In particular, this implies that such markets converge to a stable state (constant approximation) in time logarithmic in the market size.
The natural question at this point is whether there are r-round protocols with better approximation factors that still use n o(1) bits of communication per player. This question was left open in [DNO14] , where it was pointed out that it was even open whether the exactly optimal matching can be found by 2-round protocols that use O(log n) bits of communication per player. We answer this open problem by proving lower bounds for any fixed number of rounds.
Theorem: For every r ≥ 1 there exists (r) = exp(−r), such that every (deterministic or randomized) r-round protocol requires n (r) bits of communication per player in order to find a matching whose size is at least n − (r) fraction of the optimal matching. a) Our Techniques. : We construct a recursive family of hard distributions for every fixed number of communication rounds, and use information theoretic machinery to analyze it. Our proof uses a type of direct-sum based round-reduction argument for multiparty communication complexity. Unlike standard round-elimination arguments in the two-party model, our instance size (and thus the number of players) scales with the number of allowable rounds, and therefore eliminating a communication round essentially requires embedding a "low dimensional" instance (with fewer players) into a "higher dimensional" protocol (operating over a larger input), from its second round onwards. In order to carry out such an embedding, we need a way of sampling the rest of the inputs to the higher dimensional protocol (including the remaining players) conditioned on the first message of the protocol, with no extra communication. The main obstacle is that conditioning on the first message of the "high dimensional" protocol correlates the private inputs of the players (i.e., the inputs to the "lower dimensional" protocol) with the "missing" inputs, and it is not hard to see that, in general, such sampling cannot be done without communication! Circumventing this major obstacle calls for a subtle construction and analysis, which ensures the aforementioned correlations remain "local" and therefore allows to perform the embedding using a combination of private and public randomness. Our constructed family of distributions is designed to facilitate such embedding (using certain conditional independence properties) on one hand, and yet retain a "marginal indistinguishability" property which is essential to keep the information argument above valid (we discuss this further in Section IV).
A. More context and related models
The bipartite matching problem is clearly a very basic one and obviously models a host of situations beyond the economic one that was the direct motivation of [DNO14] and of this paper. Despite having been widely studied, even its algorithmic status is not well understood, and it is not clear whether a nearly-linear time algorithm exists for it. (The best known running time (for the dense case) is the 40-year old O(n 2.5 ) algorithm of [HK73] , but for special cases like regular or near-regular graphs nearly linear times are known (e.g. [Alo03] , [Yus13] )). In parallel computation, a major open problem is whether bipartite matching can be solved in deterministic parallel poly-logarithmic time with a polynomial number of processors (Randomized parallel algorithms for the problem [MVV87] , [KUW85] have been known for over 25 years). It was suggested in [DNO14] that studying the problem in the communication complexity model is an approach that might lead to algorithmic insights as well.
The bipartite matching problem has been studied in various other multi-party models that focus on communication as well. In particular, strong and tight bounds for approximate matching are known in the weaker "message passing" or "private channels" models [HRVZ13] that have implications to models of parallel and distributed computation . Related work has also been done in networked distributed computing models, e.g., [LPSP08] . "Oneway" communication models are used to analyze streaming or semi-streaming models and some upper bounds (e.g., [Kap12] ) as well as weak lower bounds [GKK12] are known for approximate matchings in these models. For "r-way" protocols, a super-linear communication lower bound was recently shown by [GO13] for exact matchings, in an incomparable model 2 . A somewhat more detailed survey of these related models can be found in the appendix of [DNO14] .
It is noteworthy that, even in the standard two-party model 3 , we do not know any better upper bound than the multiparty ones mentioned above for finding a maximum matching (even though, of course, a 1/2-approximation II. PRELIMINARIES We reserve capital letters for random variables, and calligraphic letters for sets. The 1 (statistical) distance between two distributions in the same probability space is denoted |μ − ν| := 1 2 · a |μ(a) − ν(a)|. When μ is a joint distribution, for example a bivariate distribution μ(a, b), we sometimes write μ(a) := b μ(a, b) to denote the marginal distribution of a under μ, and μ(a|b) := μ(a, b)/μ(b) to denote the conditional distribution of a given b under μ. We write X ⊥ Y | Z to denote that X and Y are statistically independent conditioned on the random variable Z. For a vector random variable X = X 1 X 2 . . . X s , we sometimes use the shorthands X ≤i and X −i to denote X 1 X 2 . . . X i and X 1 X 2 . . . X i−1 , X i+1 , . . . . . . X s respectively (similarly, X −i := X 1 X 2 . . . X i−1 X i+1 . . . X s ). We write A ∈ R U to denote a uniformly distributed random variable over the set U . We use the terms "bidders" and "players" interchangeably throughout the paper.
A. Communication Model
Our framework is the number-in-hand (NIH) multiparty communication complexity model with shared blackboard. In this model, n players receive inputs (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X 1 × X 2 × . . . X n respectively. In our context, each of the n players (bidders) is associated with a node u ∈ U = [n] of some bipartite graph G = (U, V, E), and her input is the set of incident edges on her node (her demand set of items in V = [m]). The players' goal is to compute a maximum set of disjoint connected pairs (u, v) ∈ E(G), i.e., a maximum matching in G (we define this formally below).
The players communicate in some fixed number of rounds r, where in each communication round, players simultaneously write (at most) bits each on a shared blackboard which is viewable to all parties. We sometimes refer to the parameter as the bandwidth of the protocol. In a deterministic protocol, each player's message should be completely determined by the content of the blackboard and her own private input x i . In a randomized protocol, the message of each player may further depend on both public and private random coins. When player's inputs are distributional ((x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∼ μ) which is the setting in this paper, we may assume without loss of generality that the protocol is deterministic, since the averaging principle asserts that there is always some fixing of the randomness that will achieve the same performance with respect to μ. We remark that by the averaging principle, our main result applies to the randomized setting as well 4 .
The transcript of a protocol π (namely, the content of the blackboard) when executed on an input graph G is denoted by Π(G), or simply Π when clear from context. At the end of the r'th communication round, a referee (the "central planner" in our context) computes a matchingM(Π), which is completely determined by Π. We call this the output of the protocol.
We will be interested in protocols that compute approximate matchings. To make this more formal, let G(n, m) denote the family of bipartite graphs on (n, m)-vertex sets respectively, and denote by F(n, m) the family of all matchings in G(n, m) (not necessarily maximum matchings). Denote by |M(G)| the size of a maximum matching in the input graph G. We require that the output of any protocol satisfiesM(Π) ∈ F(n, m). The following definition is central to this work.
Definition II.1 (Approximate Matchings). We say that a protocol π computes an α-approximate
The expected matching size of π is E μ [|M(Π) ∩ E(G)|] (we remark that the "hard" distribution we construct in the next section will satisfy |M(G)| ≡ n for all G in the support of μ, so the quantity EG∼μ[|M(G)|] will always be n). Note that these definitions in particular allow the protocol to be erroneous, i.e., the referee is allowed to output "illegal" pairs (u, v) / ∈ E(G), but we only count the correctly matched pairs. Our lower bound holds even with respect to this more permissive model.
B. Information theory
Our proof relies on basic concepts from information theory. For a broader introduction to the field, and proofs of the claims below, we refer the reader to the excellent monograph of [CT91] .
For two distributions μ and ν in the same probability space, the Kullback-Leiber divergence between μ and ν is defined as
(1)
The following well known inequality upper bounds the statistical distance between two distributions in terms of their KL Divergence:
Lemma II.2 (Pinsker's inequality). For any two distributions μ and ν,
A related measure which is central to this paper is that of mutual information, which captures correlation between random variables.
Definition II.3 (Conditional Mutual Information). Let A, B, C be jointly distributed random variables. The Mutual Information between A and B conditioned on C is
The above definition can be interpreted as follows:
for typical values of b, c, which means that B provides a lot of information about A conditioned on C. We note that an equivalent, more intuitive definition of (conditional) mutual information is
is the (expected) Shannon Entropy of the random variable A conditioned on C. Thus A and B have large mutual information conditioned on C, if further conditioning on B significantly reduces the entropy of A. We prefer Definition II.3 as it is more appropriate for our proof, but we note that the latter one immediately implies
where the last term denotes the cardinality of log |Supp(A)| of the random variable A, and the second transition follows since conditioning never increases entropy.
The most important property of mutual information is that it satisfies the following chain rule: Fact II.10. Let μ and ν be two probability distributions over a non-negative random variable X, whose value is bounded by
III. A HARD DISTRIBUTION FOR r-ROUND PROTOCOLS
We begin by defining a family of hard distributions for protocols with r rounds. Recall that G(n, m) is the family of bipartite graphs on (n, m) vertex-sets. For any given number of rounds r, we define a hard distribution μ r on bipartite graphs in G(n r , m r ). μ r is recursively defined in Figure 1 .
A recursive definition of the hard distribution μ r
In what follows, is a parameter (denoting the bandwidth of the communication channel). 1) For r = 0, G 0 = (U 0 , V 0 , E 0 ) consists of a set of n 0 bidders U 0 = {b 1 , . . . , b n0 } and a set of m 0 items V 0 = {j 1 . . . , j m0 }, such that n 0 = m 0 = 5 . E 0 is then obtained by selecting a random permutation σ ∈ R S 5 and connecting (b i , j σ(i) ) by an edge. This specifies μ 0 . 2) For any r ≥ 0, the distribution μ r+1 over G r+1 = (U r+1 , V r+1 , E r+1 ) is defined as follows:
Vertices: The vertex sets (U r+1 , V r+1 ) are divided into blocks of bidders (B i ) and blocks of items (T j ) respectively, as follows:
Thus, m r+1 = (n 4 r + · n 2 r ) · m r . Edges: Let d r be the degree of each vertex (bidder) in the graph G r (this is well defined as, by induction, it holds that the degree of any vertex is fixed for every graph in the support of μ r ). The distribution on edges is obtained by first choosing · n 2 r random indices {a 1 , a 2 , . . . a ·n 2 r } from [n 4 r + · n 2 r ], and a random invertible map σ : [n 4 r ] −→ [n 4 r + · n 2 r ] \ {a 1 , a 2 , . . . a ·n 2 r }. Each bidder u ∈ B i is connected to d r random items in each one of the blocks T a1 , T a2 , . . . , T a ·n 2 r , using independent randomness for each of the blocks and for each bidder. The entire block B i is further connected to the entire block T σ(i) using an independent copy of the distribution μ r . Note that this is well defined, as |B i | = n r , |T σ(i) | = m r and μ r is indeed a distribution on bipartite graphs from G(n r , m r ). Remark III.1. A few remarks are in order:
(i) As standard, the input of each bidder u ∈ U r+1 is the set of incident edges on the vertex u (defined by μ r+1 ). Note that every graph in the support of μ r+1 has a perfect matching (|M(G r+1 )| = n r+1 ). (ii) It is easy to see by induction that : (a) n r = 5 r+1 ; and (b) m r ≤ n 2 r . (Proof of (b): By induction on r, m r+1 := (n 4 r + · n 2 r ) · m r ≤ (n 4 r + · n 2 r ) · n 2 r ≤ 2n 6 r < n 2 r+1 ). (iii) Note that in μ r+1 , each block of bidders B i is connected to its "hidden item block" T σ(i) using a copy of the joint distribution μ r , and to each of the "fooling item blocks" T aj , using the product of the marginals of μ r , i.e., according to × u∈[nr] (μ r |u). This property will be crucial.
(iv) Throughout the paper, we assume the bandwidth parameter is larger than some large enough absolute constant (note that by (ii) above, in fact = ω r (1)).
b) Notation. : To facilitate our analysis, the following notation will be useful. Notice that each block B i of players is connected to exactly · n 2 r + 1 blocks of items whose indices we denote by I i := {σ(i), a 1 , a 2 , . . . a ·n 2 r }. For each B i , let τ i : I i −→ [ · n 2 r + 1] be the bijection that maps any index in I i to its location in the sorted list of
is the second smallest index in I i and so forth). We henceforth denote by G i j the (induced) subgraph of G = G r+1 on the sets (B i , T τ −1 i (j) ), for each j ∈ [ · n 2 r + 1]. By a slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes write G i j = (B i , T τ −1 i (j) ) to denote the specific set of edges of G i j . Similarly, for a bidder u ∈ B i , let G u j = (u, T τ −1 i (j) ) denote the (induced) subgraph of G on the sets (u, T τ −1 i (j) ). In this notation, the entire input of a player u ∈
denote the index of the "hidden graph" G i Ji = (B i , T σ(i) ). To avoid confusion (with the other indices j), we henceforth write G(J i ) := G i Ji . Note that by symmetry of our construction, the index J i is uniformly distributed in [ · n 2 r + 1]. The following fact will be crucial to our analysis: Proof: Recall that Γ u = {G u 1 , G u 2 , . . . , G u ·n 2 r +1 } is the input of bidder u. The claim follows directly from property (iii) in Remark III.1, since by definition of our construction, the distribution of edges of G u j = (u, T τ −1 i (j) ) is (μ r |u) for all j ∈ [ · n 2 r + 1]. We remark that the above fact implies that, up to a permutation on the names of the items in V r+1 , G u j ∼ G u k for any bidder u ∈ B i and any j = k ∈ [ · n 2 r + 1]. Finally, Let B denote the partition of bidders in U := U r+1 into the blocks B i , and T denote the partition of items in V := V r+1 into the blocks T j . Throughout the proof, we think of T and B as fixed, while we think of the names of the bidders in each block of B and items in each block of T as random. Since T and B are fixed (publicly known) in the distribution μ r+1 , our entire analysis is performed under the implicit conditioning on T , B. Note that T does not reveal the identity of the "fooling blocks" T aj , but only the items belonging to each block.
IV. THE LOWER BOUND
In this section we prove our main result. Recall that the expected matching size of π (with respect to μ) is
We shall prove the following theorem.
Theorem IV.1 (Main Result). The expected matching size of any r-round protocol under μ r is at most 5n
This holds as long as the number of bits sent by each player at any round is at most = n 1/5 r+1 r . In particular, since μ r has a perfect matching, the approximation ratio of any r-round protocol is no better than Ω n 1/5 r+1 r .
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. Consider some (r + 1)-round protocol π (with bandwidth ), and let M Bi = M 1 Bi M 2 Bi , . . . , M nr Bi denote the (concatenated) messages sent by all of the bidders in a block B i in the first round of π. From this point on, we will assume that π is a deterministic protocol (since by the averaging principle we may fix its randomness without harming the performance). Informally speaking, the distribution μ r+1 is designed so that messages of bidders in B i (M u Bi ) convey little information about the "hidden" graph G(J i ). Intuitively, this will be true since the marginal distribution of the hidden graph G u Ji for any bidder u ∈ B i is indistinguishable from the rest of the "fooling graphs" (Fact III.2) and therefore a bidder in B i will not be able to distinguish between vertices (items) in ·n 2 r j=1 T aj and in T σ(i) . Using the conditional independence properties of the distribution μ r+1 and the simultaneity of the protocol, we will show that the latter condition also implies that the total information conveyed by M Bi on G(J i ) is small. In order to make this information 1 bit, the parameters are chosen so that n r grows doubly-exponentially in r (n r = 5 r+1 ), and this choice is the cause for the approximation ratio we eventually obtain. Intuitively, the fact that little information is conveyed by each block on the "hidden graph" implies that the distribution of edges in the graph G(J i ) is still close to μ r even conditioned on the first message of the i'th block M Bi . Now suppose an (r + 1)-round protocol finds a large matching with respect to the original distribution μ r+1 (in expectation). Then the expected induced matching size on G(J i ) must be large on average as well. Hence, "ignoring" the first round of the protocol, we would like to argue that the original protocol essentially induces an r-round protocol for finding a large matching with respect to the distribution μ r , up to some error term (indeed, some information about G(J i ) may have already been discovered in the first round of the protocol, but the argument above ensures that this information is small). Doing so essentially reduced the problem to finding a large matching under μ r using only r rounds, so we may use an inductive approach to upper bound the latter expected matching size.
Making the latter intuition precise is complicated by the fact that, unlike standard "round-elimination" arguments in the two-party setting, in our setup one cannot simply "project" an r-round n r+1 -party protocol (with inputs ∼ μ r+1 ) directly to the distribution μ r , since a protocol for the latter distribution has only n r players (inputs). To remedy this, we crucially rely on the conditional independence properties of our construction (Lemma IV.6 below) together with an embedding argument to obtain the desired lower bound.
The embedding part of the proof (Claim IV.7) is subtle, since in general, conditioning on the first message M 1 correlates the (private) inputs of the players with the "missing" inputs to the "higher-dimensional" protocol (the "fooling item blocks" of μ r+1 ), so it is not clear how the players can sample these "missing" inputs without communicating. Luckily and crucially, the edges to the "fooling blocks" T aj in μ r+1 were chosen independently for each bidder u ∈ U (unlike the hidden graphs G(J i ) in which players have correlated edges). This independence is what allows to embed a lower-dimensional graph H ∼ μ r and "complete" the rest of the graph (using a combination of public and private randomness) according to the conditional distribution (G|M 1 , H) without any communication, thus "saving" one round of communication.
We now turn to formalize the above intuition. From this point on, let us use the shorthands J := J 1 , . . . , J n 4 r , I := I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I n 4 r . Also, for the remainder of the proof, let us define for simplicity
Let π be an (r + 1)-round deterministic protocol. For a given message m Bi := m 1 Bi m 2 Bi , . . . , m nr Bi sent in π by the bidders in block B i in the first round of π, a fixing of the index J i = j i of the "hidden" block of items, and of the partition I i , let ψ i r := (G(J i ) | M Bi = m Bi , J i = j i , I i ) denote the distribution of the "hidden graph" G(J i ) conditioned on M Bi , I i and J i . The following lemma asserts that, in expectation over the first communication round of π, the marginal distribution of G(J i ) is very close to its original distribution μ r .
Proof: We begin by showing that the local message M u Bi of any bidder u ∈ B i conveys little information on G(J i ). Note that Fact III.2 (and the Data Processing inequality (Fact II.9)) together imply that, for any block B i of bidders and any u ∈ B i ,
(2) (Note that in contrast, I(M Bi ; J i | I i ) = 0. In fact, J i may be almost determined by the entire message of the i'th block (let alone by the entire message M 1 of π), as the induced distribution of G(J i ) is different than that of G i j , j = J i . This is where we crucially use the simultaneaty of bidder's messages). We will also need the following proposition:
Proposition IV.3. For any bidder u ∈ B i and any j ∈ [ · n 2 r + 1], it holds that
r +1 } is the input of bidder u, and notice that for any j ∈ [ ·n 2 r +1],
is a Markov chain where the left chain holds since, conditioned on (Γ u , I i , J i = j), M u Bi is completely determined and therefore independent of G i j and G u j , and the right chain holds since conditioned on I i , J i = j and the graph G u j , the rest of the edges of the graph G i j are independent of Γ u by construction. Therefore, by the (general) Data Processing inequality (Fact II.8), we have
Now, by Fact III.2, we know that the distribution of (Γ u |I i ) is independent of the event "J i = j". Since M u Bi and G u j are deterministic functions of Γ u (conditioned on I i ), this also implies that the joint distribution of (M u Bi , G u j |I i ) is independent of the event "J i = j". Therefore, we conclude by (3) that
We proceed to prove the Lemma. We may now write for any u ∈ B i
(By definition of conditional mutual information and since J i ∈ R [ · n 2 r + 1] and by (2))
where the inequality in (4) follows from Lemma II.6 taken with 
Combining (6), Pinsker's inequality (Lemma II.2) and convexity of √ · completes the entire proof of the lemma.
We are now ready to prove Theorem IV.1. To this end, for any r-round protocol π, input graph G, and induced subgraph H ⊆ G, let N π (G, H) := |M(Π(G)) ∩ E(H)| denote the size of the matching computed from π's transcript with respect to the subgraph H (note that N π (G, H) is a random variable depending on G). For notational convenience, we use the shorthand N π (G) := N π (G, G). Theorem IV.1 will follow directly from the following theorem:
Theorem IV.5. Let π be an r-round (deterministic) communication protocol with bandwidth . Then by definition of μ r+1 , G(J i ) ∼ μ r . Hence by linearity of expectation and the second proposition of Lemma IV.6, we may equivalently write the above as = · n 2 r · m r + By construction, the expected matching size of τ (over the private and public randomness M 1 , J, I, G) with respect to H is
